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AbstrAct
International investment agreements generally only protect investments 
in the ‘territory’ of  the respondent State. As a result, an investment tribunal 
seized of  a dispute concerning an investment on disputed territory may have 
to determine whether the respondent State has sovereignty over the terri-
tory in question. This should create some discomfort for two reasons. First, 
the tribunal may be exceeding its jurisdiction ratione personae, as it would 
be ruling on the sovereignty dispute with only one of  the disputing States 
at the table. Second, the tribunal may be exceeding its jurisdiction ratione 
materiae, as it generally only has the power to rule on investment disputes, 
not sovereignty disputes. This Article explores the merits of  two preliminary 
objections—corresponding to these two jurisdictional problems—to claims 
concerning investments on disputed territory: the doctrine of  indispensable 
parties and the doctrine of  indispensable issues.
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tary Gold, Crimea
resumo
Os acordos internacionais de investimento geralmente protegem apenas 
os investimentos no “território” do Estado anfitrião. Como resultado, um 
tribunal de investimento constituído após uma disputa poder ter que deter-
minar se o Estado respondente tem soberania sobre o território em questão. 
Isso deve criar algum desconforto por dois motivos. Primeiramente, o tri-
bunal pode exceder a sua jurisdição ratione personae, como seria julgando a 
disputa referente à soberania com apenas o Estado anfitrião, sem o Estado 
de origem. Em segundo lugar, o tribunal pode exceder a sua jurisdição ra-
tione materiae, uma vez que geralmente só tem o poder de julgar disputas 
atinentes aos investimentos e não questões de soberania. Este artigo explora 
os méritos de duas objeções preliminares - correspondentes a estes dois pro-
blemas jurisdicionais - às reivindicações sobre investimentos em território 
em disputa: a doutrina de indispensável partidos e a doutrina de questões 
indispensáveis.
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1. IntroductIon
International investment agreements (IIAs) gene-
rally only protect investments in the ‘territory’ of  the 
respondent State.1 As a result, an investment tribunal 
seized of  a dispute concerning an investment on dis-
puted territory may have to determine whether the 
respondent State has sovereignty over the territory in 
question.2 This should create some discomfort for two 
reasons. First, the tribunal may be exceeding its juris-
diction ratione personae, as it would be ruling on the so-
vereignty dispute with only one of  the disputing States 
at the table. Second, the tribunal may be exceeding its 
jurisdiction ratione materiae, as it generally only has the 
power to rule on investment disputes, not sovereignty 
disputes.
This Article explores the merits of  two preliminary 
objections—corresponding to these two jurisdictional 
problems—to claims concerning investments on dis-
puted territory: the doctrine of  indispensable parties 
and the doctrine of  indispensable issues. The doctrine 
of  indispensable parties, also called the Monetary Gold 
principle, is an objection based on the limited jurisdic-
tion ratione personae of  international courts and tribunals. 
The doctrine is widely recognized in public internatio-
nal law, though it has never been successfully applied in 
investment arbitration.3 The doctrine of  indispensable 
1 Many modern IIAs employ the word ‘area’ instead of  ‘territory’, 
but they ultimately define ‘area’ in terms of  ‘territory’. See eg Agree-
ment on Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investments 
Between the Kingdom of  the Netherlands and the Republic of  Tur-
key (signed 28 August 2016) art 1(f) <http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2090> accessed 12 September 
2017; Energy Charter Treaty (signed 17 December 1994, entered 
into force 16 April 1998) art 1(10) <http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2090> accessed 12 September 
2017.
2 A similar issue arises for investments in disputed waters, as many 
IIAs define ‘territory’ to include the territorial sea, exclusive eco-
nomic zone, and/or continental shelf  of  the respondent State. See 
eg Agreement Establishing the Free Trade Area Between the Carib-
bean Community and the Dominican Republic (signed 22 August 
1998) art 1(2) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down-
load/TreatyFile/3110> accessed 12 September 2017; Agreement 
Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of  Invest-
ments Between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Government of  
the State of  Qatar (signed 1 June 1998, entered into force 5 February 
2009) art 1(2)(b) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down-
load/TreatyFile/487> accessed 12 September 2017.
3 The respondent States invoked the doctrine in Ping An Life Insur-
ance v Belgium and Chevron Corporation v Ecuador, but the tribunals did 
not find the doctrine applicable. See Ping An Life Insurance Company, 
Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company, Limited v Kingdom of  
issues, on the other hand, is a hypothetical objection 
considered by the present author in an attempt to fill 
a conceptual gap—that is, the lack of  an equivalent of  
the doctrine of  indispensable parties for jurisdiction 
ratione materiae. The doctrine of  indispensable issues is 
thus directly analogous to the doctrine of  indispensable 
parties, but it arises from the limited jurisdiction ratio-
ne materiae of  international courts and tribunals, rather 
than their limited jurisdiction ratione personae. It should 
be emphasized that the present author is not necessarily 
of  the opinion that such a ‘doctrine of  indispensable is-
sues’ exists or should exist in international law.4 Never-
theless, the author wishes to explore the merits of  this 
doctrine in light of  its potential applicability to disputes 
concerning investments on disputed territory.
This Article is organized as follows. Section II ex-
plains how the existing doctrine of  indispensable par-
ties may affect claims concerning investments on dis-
puted territory. Section III introduces the hypothetical 
doctrine of  indispensable issues, and then explains how 
it may affect such claims. Section IV then examines one 
line of  cases in particular—the Crimea arbitrations—
to show how investments tribunals seized of  disputes 
concerning investments in disputed territory may some-
times avail themselves of  ‘escape mechanisms’ in order 
to avoid considering the two doctrines. Section V then 
concludes the Article.
2. IndIspensAble pArtIes
Two preliminary remarks regarding the doctrine of  
indispensable parties should be made here. First, the 
doctrine is often referred to as ‘the Monetary Gold prin-
ciple’ in public international law. This Article, however, 
employs the term ‘doctrine of  indispensable parties’ not 
only to elucidate the parallel with the proposed ‘doctri-
ne of  indispensable issues’, but also to emphasize the 
Belgium, ICSID Case No ARB/12/29, Award (30 April 2015) paras 
127-28; Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v Ecuador, 
PCA Case No 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (27 February 2012) para 4.60.
4 For further discussion on the doctrine of  indispensable issues, 
see Peter Tzeng, ‘The Doctrine of  Indispensable Issues: Mauritius 
v. United Kingdom, Philippines v. China, Ukraine v. Russia, and Be-
yond’, EJIL: Talk! (14 October 2016) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/
the-doctrine-of-indispensable-issues-mauritius-v-united-kingdom-
philippines-v-china-ukraine-v-russia-and-beyond/> accessed 12 
September 2017.
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fact that the doctrine as it exists today is the product of  
jurisprudence across multiple cases before the Interna-
tional Court of  Justice (ICJ), not just Monetary Gold. In-
deed, although the ICJ does not employ the term ‘indis-
pensable parties’ to refer to the principle, international 
tribunals,5 States,6 and many commentators7 have used 
the term to refer to this line of  ICJ jurisprudence.
Second, commentators generally consider the doc-
trine of  indispensable parties as an objection to admis-
sibility rather than jurisdiction,8 and the ICJ’s jurispru-
dence suggests the same.9 This Article does not take a 
position on this classification, but for consistency will 
treat the question as one of  admissibility.
2.1. Public International Law
Much ink has been spilled over the doctrine of  in-
dispensable parties, in particular over its application in 
three ICJ cases: Monetary Gold, Certain Phosphate Lands, 
and East Timor.10 As is now well known, in Monetary 
Gold, the ICJ held that a claim is inadmissible if  the le-
gal interests of  a State outside of  its jurisdiction ratione 
5 See eg The M/V ‘Norstar’ Case (Panama v Italy) (Preliminary Ob-
jections) (2016) ITLOS Case No 25, paras 171-74; South China Sea 
(Philippines v China) (Merits) (2016) PCA Case No 2013-19, paras 
157, 1202; Chevron v Ecuador (n 3) para 4.62.
6 See eg Armed Activities on the Territory of  the Congo (DRC v Uganda) 
(Merits) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 200; Turkey—Restrictions on Im-
ports of  Textile and Clothing Products (31 May 1999) WTO Doc WT/
DS34/R, para 3.39; Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Ces-
sation of  the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall 
Islands v UK) (Preliminary Objections of  the United Kingdom) (15 
June 2015), paras 83-103.
7 See eg Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (OUP 
1993) 198-212; Vaughan Lowe, International Law (OUP 2007) 146; 
Chester Brown, ‘Article 59’ in Andreas Zimmermann and others 
(eds), The Statute of  the International Court of  Justice: A Commentary (2nd 
edn, 2012) 1416, 1441; Alain Pellet, ‘Judicial Settlement of  Interna-
tional Disputes’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public International Law 
(2013) para 10.
8 See eg Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of  the International 
Court of  Justice: Fifty Years of  Jurisprudence, vol 1 (OUP 2013) 971; Yu-
val Shany, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Cesare PR Romano and 
others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of  International Adjudication (OUP 
2013) 779, 797-98.
9 See eg East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, para 
35; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) (Preliminary 
Objections) [1992] ICJ Rep 240, para 55; Monetary Gold Removed from 
Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, UK, US) [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 33.
10 See eg Chinkin (n 7) 198-212; Natalie S Klein, ‘Multilateral Dis-
putes and the Doctrine of  Necessary Parties in the East Timor Case’ 
(1996) 21 Yale JIL 305; Tobias Thienel, ‘Third States and the Juris-
diction of  the International Court of  Justice: The Monetary Gold 
Principle’ (2014) 57 GYBIL 321.
personae ‘would not only be affected by a decision, but 
would form the very subject-matter of  the decision’.11 
The critical question, however, is how one should go 
about identifying the ‘very subject-matter’ of  the deci-
sion.
The Court answered this question in its subsequent 
jurisprudence. In Certain Phosphate Lands, the Court held 
that the legal interests of  New Zealand and the Uni-
ted Kingdom would not form the ‘very subject-matter’ 
of  the decision because ‘the determination of  the res-
ponsibility of  New Zealand or the United Kingdom is 
not a prerequisite to the [decision of  the Court]’.12 And 
in East Timor, the Court held that the legal interests of  
Indonesia would form the ‘very subject-matter’ of  the 
decision because ‘[i]n order to decide the claims . . . , 
[the Court] would have to rule, as a prerequisite, on the 
lawfulness of  Indonesia’s conduct’.13
Two tests thus lie at the heart of  the doctrine: the 
‘very subject-matter’ test of  Monetary Gold and the ‘pre-
requisite determination’14 test of  Certain Phosphate Lands 
and East Timor. A close examination of  the passages 
from Certain Phosphate Lands and East Timor cited above 
reveal that satisfaction of  the ‘prerequisite determina-
tion’ test is both a necessary15 and sufficient16 condition 
for the satisfaction of  the ‘very subject-matter’ test.
The literature most often associates the doctrine 
of  indispensable parties with the ‘very subject-matter’ 
test, but the ‘prerequisite determination’ test is just as 
important: there is no question that courts and tribu-
nals consider the ‘prerequisite determination’ test to be 
determinative on whether they can exercise jurisdiction 
over a dispute. This can be seen first and foremost in 
ICJ jurisprudence. In Armed Activities and Interim Accord, 
the Court in considering the doctrine of  indispensa-
ble parties applied the ‘prerequisite determination’ test 
alongside the ‘very subject-matter’ test.17 And in two re-
cent cases, Nicaragua v Honduras and Croatia v Serbia, the 
11 Monetary Gold (n 9) 32.
12 Certain Phosphate Lands (n 9) para 55.
13 East Timor (n 9) para 35.
14 Note that this is not a direct quote from the Court’s jurispru-
dence, but in Certain Phosphate Lands and East Timor, the Court used 
the word ‘prerequisite’ in this sense in determining whether the ‘very 
subject-matter’ test was satisfied.
15 See text to n 12.
16 See text to n 13.
17 See Armed Activities (n 6) para 204; Application of  the Interim Ac-
cord of  13 September 1995 (Macedonia v Greece) [2011] ICJ Rep 644, 
para 43.
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Court in considering the doctrine referred to the ‘prere-
quisite determination’ test without referring to the ‘very 
subject-matter’ test at all.18 Other international tribunals 
have also held that, under the doctrine of  indispensable 
parties, they would not be able to exercise jurisdiction 
over a dispute if  the decision requires a prerequisite de-
termination on the legal responsibility of  a State outside 
of  their jurisdiction ratione personae.19 As Judge Crawford 
put it recently in his dissenting opinion in the Nuclear 
Disarmament cases:
The case law has . . . set firm limits to the Monetary 
Gold principle. It applies only where a determination 
of  the legal position of  a third State is a necessary 
prerequisite to the determination of  the case before 
the Court.20
In conclusion, then, the doctrine of  indispensable 
parties can be summarized as follows: an internatio-
nal court or tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
a dispute if  the legal interests of  a State outside of  its 
jurisdiction ratione personae would form the ‘very subject-
-matter’ of  the decision, which is the case if  and only if  
the decision requires a ‘prerequisite determination’ on 
the legal responsibility of  that State.
2.2. Investment Law
To this day, no investment tribunal has applied the 
doctrine of  indispensable parties to declare a claim 
inadmissible.21 This should not come as a surprise, as 
investment disputes are typically bilateral disputes that 
take place between an investor and a State. Neverthe-
less, claims concerning investments on disputed terri-
tory could render the doctrine of  indispensable parties 
applicable. The applicability of  the doctrine may de-
pend on whether the territory is (1) disputed between 
two States; or (2) disputed between a State and a non-
-State actor. These two scenarios will be discussed in 
turn.
18 Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in 
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras) [2007] ICJ Rep 659, para 312; 
Application of  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime 
of  Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) (Merits) [2015] ICJ Rep, para 116.
19 M/V Norstar (Preliminary Objections) (n 5) para 173; South 
China Sea (Philippines v China) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2015) 
PCA Case No 2013-19, para 180; Larsen v Hawaiian Kingdom (2001) 
PCA Case No 1999-01, 119 ILR 566, para 11.23.
20 Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of  the Nu-
clear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v United 
Kingdom) (Dissenting Opinion of  Judge Crawford) [2016] ICJ Rep, 
para 32 (emphasis added).
21 See n 3.
In the first scenario, the application of  the doctrine 
of  indispensable parties would likely render the claim 
inadmissible. Suppose, for example, that a US corpora-
tion makes an investment on the Falkland Islands, and 
subsequently sues Argentina for not having afforded 
it the protections guaranteed under the Argentina-US 
BIT. Article I(1)(a) of  the BIT defines ‘investment’ as 
‘every kind of  investment in the territory of  one Party 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals 
or companies of  the other Party’.22 As a result, assu-
ming that the tribunal does not avail itself  of  an escape 
mechanism (as discussed below in Section IV), the de-
cision on the US corporation’s claim would require a 
‘prerequisite determination’ on whether the Falkland Is-
lands constitute Argentinian territory. Since the United 
Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Falkland Is-
lands, this determination on sovereignty would consti-
tute a determination on the legal interests of  the United 
Kingdom, a State over which the tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction ratione personae. As a result, applying the doc-
trine of  indispensable parties, the tribunal would find 
that the legal interests of  the United Kingdom would 
form the ‘very subject-matter’ of  the decision, rende-
ring the claim inadmissible.
It is worth evaluating whether, normatively speaking, 
this is the preferable result. On the one hand, the result 
makes sense, as it would be antithetical to the principles 
of  consent and audi alteram partem for the tribunal to 
rule on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands without 
the United Kingdom at the table. Allowing the tribu-
nal to make such a determination would be particularly 
concerning in light of  the fact that the two parties to the 
arbitration—the US corporation and Argentina—have 
an interest in convincing the tribunal that the Falkland 
Islands constitute Argentinian territory. The corpora-
tion has such an interest because the Falkland Islands 
must constitute Argentinian territory for its investment 
to qualify as an ‘investment’ under Article I(1)(a) of  
the BIT, and Argentina has such an interest because it 
would not want to undermine the legitimacy of  its claim 
of  sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. Moreover, the 
parties would likely have the right to appoint a majority 
22 Treaty Between the United States of  America and the Ar-
gentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment (signed 14 November 1991, entered into 
force 20 October 1994) art I(1)(a) (emphasis added) <http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/127> accessed 
12 September 2017.
TZ
E
N
G
, P
et
er
. I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 o
n 
D
isp
ut
ed
 T
er
rit
or
y: 
In
di
sp
en
sa
bl
e 
Pa
rti
es
 a
nd
 In
di
sp
en
sa
bl
e 
Is
su
es
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 1
21
-1
38
126
of  the arbitrators sitting on each tribunal,23 so the tribu-
nal itself  may not be completely impartial.
On the other hand, declaring the claims inadmis-
sible may be normatively unappealing for at least four 
reasons. First, the application of  the doctrine appears 
inappropriate. It is true that the tribunal’s settlement 
of  the investment claim would require a ‘prerequisi-
te determination’ on the legal interests of  the United 
Kingdom. Nevertheless, putting aside the plethora of  
jurisprudence on the doctrine mentioned above,24 it is 
difficult to understand how the legal interests of  the 
United Kingdom would form the ‘very subject-matter’ 
of  the decision in the ordinary sense of  the phrase ‘very 
subject-matter’. Absent any indication otherwise, the 
‘very subject-matter’ of  the investment claim is undou-
btedly the investment claim itself, not the underlying is-
sue of  sovereignty. Therefore, one could make a cogent 
argument that the doctrine of  indispensable parties as 
developed by the ICJ and accepted by other courts and 
tribunals should be either revised or rejected in the con-
text of  investment disputes concerning investments on 
disputed territory.
Second, the application of  the doctrine appears un-
justified. The determination on sovereignty would be res 
inter alios acta between the investor and the respondent 
State only, and in any case would merely form part of  
the ratio decidendi, not the dispositif. As a result, the deter-
mination would neither be binding on the absent State, 
nor would it have res judicata effect on the absent State, 
nor would it give rise to any legal consequences aside 
from the settlement of  the investment dispute. The 
counterargument, however, is that any determination by 
an international court or tribunal, even if  not formally 
binding, may carry significant informal weight. After 
all, it should be recalled that these arguments have also 
been raised against the doctrine of  indispensable parties 
in general, but they did not stop the ICJ from applying 
the doctrine and refusing to exercise jurisdiction in Mo-
netary Gold and East Timor.
Third, the application of  the doctrine appears ine-
quitable. The reason is that the respondent State would 
23 Like many other IIAs, the US-Argentina BIT allows for arbi-
trations to be instituted under the ICSID Convention or the UN-
CITRAL Rules. See ibid art VII(3). In the common scenario of  a 
three-member tribunal, Article 37(2)(b) of  the ICSID Convention 
and Article 9(1) of  the UNCITRAL Rules provide that each party 
has the right to appoint one arbitrator.
24 See text to n 10-20.
on the one hand be able to claim sovereignty over a 
certain piece of  territory, but on the other hand not be 
held responsible for obligations that should apply to its 
entire territory on that piece of  territory. The claimant 
could try to invoke estoppel, but the tribunal may deci-
de that it must determine its jurisdiction and the admis-
sibility of  the claim proprio motu, without relying on the 
objections of  the parties.25 In the end, this concern is 
best addressed through the drafting (or redrafting) of  
IIAs. If  one is truly concerned about activities of  States 
on territory under their ‘effective control’ and/or ‘juris-
diction and/or control’, then IIAs should employ those 
terms rather than ‘territory’.
Fourth, the application of  the doctrine could incen-
tivize the respondent State to engage in misconduct. In 
particular, in light of  the potential for an estoppel ar-
gument as discussed above, the respondent State may 
choose to not participate in the proceedings. This way, 
it can avoid the difficult scenario of  claiming sovereign-
ty over a certain piece of  territory while asserting that 
obligations that should apply to its entire territory do 
not apply to that piece of  territory. Indeed, Russia may 
have chosen to not participate in the Crimea arbitrations 
(discussed below in Section IV), for this very reason. In 
addition, the application of  the doctrine could also in-
centivize the respondent State to claim the existence of  
territorial disputes in order to render investment claims 
inadmissible. This concern, however, is mitigated by the 
fact that, more often than not, respondent States would 
not wish to admit that certain territory that they claim 
is in dispute. For example, it would be peculiar for Rus-
sia to argue before the Crimea tribunals that Crimea is 
disputed territory; rather, if  it were to participate in the 
arbitrations, it would likely argue that Crimea lawfully 
acceded to Russia via popular referendum. In any case, 
under the principle of  competence-competence, the 
tribunal would be the one deciding whether a genuine 
territorial dispute exists.
In the second scenario mentioned above—where 
25 See Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of  the ICAO Council (India v 
Pakistan) [1972] ICJ Rep 46, para 13; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC 
European Food SA, SC Starmill SRL and SC Multipack SRL v Romania, 
ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admis-
sibility (24 September 2008) para 65; Baiju S. Vasani and Timothy 
L Foden, ‘Burden of  Proof  Regarding Jurisdiction’ in Katia Yann-
aca-Small (ed), Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A 
Guide to the Key Issues (OUP 2010) 271, 271; Alex Grabowski, ‘The 
Definition of  Investment Under the ICSID Convention: A Defense 
of  Salini’ (2014) 15 Chicago JIL 287, 289.
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the territory is disputed between a State and a non-State 
actor—the application of  the doctrine of  indispensable 
parties would probably not render the claim inadmis-
sible. The same logic applies, but the difference is that 
the ‘indispensable party’ is no longer a State, but rather 
a non-State actor. Suppose, for example, that a British 
corporation makes an investment in Western Sahara, 
and subsequently sues Morocco for not having affor-
ded it the protections guaranteed under the Morocco-
-UK BIT. Article 1(a) of  the BIT defines ‘investment’ as 
‘every kind of  investment made in accordance with le-
gislation and regulations in force in the territory of  each 
of  the Contracting Parties’.26 As a result, assuming that 
the tribunal does not avail itself  of  an escape mecha-
nism, it may have to determine whether Western Sahara 
constitutes Moroccan territory. The tribunal could at-
tempt to invoke the doctrine of  indispensable parties, 
citing the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as the ‘in-
dispensable party’. But the question arises as to whether 
non-State actors can be indispensable parties under the 
doctrine.
As a matter of  public international law, the answer 
is a resounding ‘no’. The reason is that the principle of  
consent—the ultimate source of  the doctrine of  indis-
pensable parties—only requires the consent of  States, 
not the consent of  non-State actors. East Timor is a pri-
me example. While the ICJ accepted the argument that 
Indonesia was an indispensable party to the proceedin-
gs, the Court did not even consider whether the people 
of  East Timor could be an ‘indispensable party’.27 To 
cite another example, in Obligation to Prosecute or Extradi-
te, the ICJ rendered a judgment where the rights of  for-
mer Chadian President Hissène Habré arguably formed 
the ‘very subject-matter’ of  the decision, but he was not 
a party to the dispute.28 In short, as a matter of  public 
international law, non-State actors may not constitute 
‘indispensable parties’.
Should this also be true for investment tribunals? 
As many scholars have noted, investment arbitration 
stands at the juncture between public and private in-
26 Agreement Between the Government of  the United Kingdom 
of  Great Britain and Northern Island and the Government of  the 
Kingdom of  Morocco for the Promotion and Protection of  Invest-
ments (signed 30 October 1990, entered into force 14 February 
2002) art 1(a) (emphasis added) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unc-
tad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2051> accessed 12 September 2017.
27 East Timor (n 9); see Chinkin (n 7) 210.
28 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium 
v Senegal) (Merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 422. 
ternational law. The very fact that one of  the parties 
to almost every investment dispute is a non-State actor 
may suggest that investment tribunals should recognize 
non-State actors as subjects of  the international legal 
order. Moreover, from the perspective of  public policy, 
it would seem peculiar if  the doctrine of  indispensable 
parties applied only to some disputed territories (those 
disputed between two States) but not others (those dis-
puted between a State and a non-State actor). Neverthe-
less, the policy consequences of  allowing any non-State 
actor to be an indispensable party would be significant: 
non-governmental organizations and international cor-
porations whose rights are implicated by the decisions 
of  investment tribunals could start claiming indispen-
sable party status. As a result, if  one allows non-State 
actors to be indispensable parties, there must be a line 
drawn regarding the sorts of  entities that may qualify as 
indispensable parties.  
It would thus be difficult for the doctrine of  indis-
pensable parties to render a claim concerning an invest-
ment on territory disputed between a State and a non-
-State actor inadmissible. Nevertheless, in such a case, 
the doctrine of  indispensable issues may be of  use.
3. IndIspensAble Issues
In order for an international court or tribunal to 
exercise jurisdiction over a dispute, it must have both 
jurisdiction ratione personae over the parties and jurisdic-
tion ratione materiae over the issues. In theory, then, if  the 
doctrine of  indispensable parties exists, a corresponding 
doctrine for jurisdiction ratione materiae—which this Ar-
ticle calls ‘the doctrine of  indispensable issues’—should 
exist as well. As mentioned above in Section I, the pre-
sent author is not necessarily of  the opinion that such a 
‘doctrine of  indispensable issues’ exists or should exist 
in international law. Nevertheless, the author wishes to 
explore this hypothetical doctrine in light of  its poten-
tial applicability to disputes concerning investments on 
disputed territory.
As examined above in Section II, under the doctrine 
of  indispensable parties, an international court or tri-
bunal cannot exercise jurisdiction over a dispute if  the 
legal interests of  a State outside of  its jurisdiction ratio-
ne personae would form the ‘very subject-matter’ of  the 
decision, which is the case if  and only if  the decision 
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requires a ‘prerequisite determination’ on the legal res-
ponsibility of  that State. Analogously, then, under the 
doctrine of  indispensable issues, an international court 
or tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction over a dispute 
if  a legal issue outside of  its jurisdiction ratione materiae 
forms the ‘very subject-matter’ of  the decision, which is 
the case if  and only if  the decision requires a ‘prerequi-
site determination’ on that legal issue.
Unlike the doctrine of  indispensable parties, courts 
and tribunals dealing with indispensable issues have ten-
ded to treat the question as one of  jurisdiction. This 
Article once again does not take a position on this clas-
sification, but for consistency will treat the question as 
one of  jurisdiction.
3.1. Public International Law
At least two ICJ disputes and two disputes under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea 
(UNCLOS)29 have raised the question of  indispensable 
issues. Neither the ICJ nor the UNCLOS tribunals ex-
pressly recognized or applied all elements of  the doc-
trine of  indispensable issues as defined above. Never-
theless, in at least three of  the disputes, the holding was 
consistent with the doctrine and the reasoning reflected 
at least some elements of  the doctrine.
The first ICJ case is Aegean Sea Continental Shelf.30 In 
that case, Greece instituted proceedings against Turkey, 
requesting the Court to, inter alia, delimit the continen-
tal shelf  between Greece and Turkey.31 The Court had 
jurisdiction over the delimitation dispute under the Ge-
neral Act for the Pacific Settlement of  International 
Disputes (the General Act).32 A Greek reservation to 
the General Act, however, excluded the Court’s juris-
diction over ‘disputes relating to the territorial status of  
Greece’,33 which the Court considered to include issues 
29 United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (opened for 
signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 
1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).
30 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf  (Greece v Turkey) [1978] ICJ Rep 3.
31 ibid para 15.
32 ibid para 33.
33 ibid para 48. To be precise, Greece’s reservation excluded ‘dis-
putes concerning questions which by international law are solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction of  States, and in particular disputes 
relating to the territorial status of  Greece’. ibid. The Court held that 
this clause ‘comprises two reservations, one of  disputes concern-
ing questions of  domestic jurisdiction and the other a distinct and 
autonomous reservation of  “disputes relating to the territorial status 
of  Greece”’. ibid para 68.
of  entitlement to the continental shelf.34
In order to determine whether it had jurisdiction 
over the dispute, the Court decided that it had to iden-
tify ‘the subject-matter of  the dispute’.35 It then held:
The very essence of  the dispute, as formulated in 
the Application, is . . . the entitlement of  [the] Greek 
islands to a continental shelf, and the delimitation 
of  the boundary is a secondary question to be decided 
after, and in the light of, the decision upon the first 
basic question.36
The Court therefore held that the dispute fell within 
the Greek reservation, such that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over the delimitation dispute.37
The Court’s holding was consistent with the doctri-
ne of  indispensable issues: the delimitation would have 
required a prerequisite determination on the entitlement 
issue, which fell outside the Court’s jurisdiction ratione 
materiae. The Court’s reasoning also contained elements 
of  the doctrine. The Court relied on its identification 
of  ‘the subject-matter of  the dispute’, just as the Court 
in Monetary Gold relied on its identification of  the ‘very 
subject-matter’ of  the decision. And the Court noted 
that the delimitation issue could only be decided after 
a determination on the entitled issue; in other words, 
settling the delimitation dispute required a prerequisi-
te determination on the entitlement issue. The Court’s 
reasoning, however, slightly parted from the doctrine of  
indispensable issues in that, as seen in the quote excerp-
ted above, the Court considered the formulation of  the 
dispute in Greece’s Application in identifying the ‘very 
essence of  the dispute’.
The second ICJ case is Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/
Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.38 In that 
case, Malaysia and Singapore requested the Court to 
determine, inter alia, whether Malaysia or Singapore 
had sovereignty over a low-tide elevation called South 
Ledge.39 By virtue of  the special agreement, the Court 
had jurisdiction over this sovereignty dispute.40 Never-
theless, this dispute implicated the question of  mariti-
me delimitation between the two States, over which the 
34 ibid para 84.
35 ibid para 82.
36 ibid para 83 (emphasis added).
37 ibid para 90.
38 Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) [2008] ICJ Rep 12.
39 ibid paras 1-2, 31.
40 ibid para 298.
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Court did not have jurisdiction ratione materiae.41 This 
was because, as a low-tide elevation, South Ledge was 
subject to the rule that ‘a coastal State has sovereign-
ty over low-tide elevations which are situated within its 
territorial sea’,42 and yet South Ledge lied within twelve 
nautical miles (the breadth of  the territorial sea43) of  
both Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks.44
The Court’s handling of  this matter was very con-
cise. It did not specify who had sovereignty over South 
Ledge, instead merely observing that ‘sovereignty over 
South Ledge . . . belongs to the State in the territorial 
waters of  which it is located’.45 Like the Court’s hol-
ding in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the Court’s holding 
here was consistent with the doctrine of  indispensable 
issues because the settlement of  the sovereignty dispute 
would have required a prerequisite determination on the 
delimitation issue. The Court’s reasoning, however, was 
very sparse and thus did not contain any reference to 
the ‘very subject-matter’ or ‘prior determination’ tests.
Two recent UNCLOS tribunals have also rendered 
decisions concerning the doctrine of  indispensable is-
sues. In Chagos Marine Protected Area, Mauritius requested 
an UNCLOS tribunal to interpret and apply the term 
‘coastal State’ as used in UNCLOS with respect to the 
Chagos Archipelago.46 The tribunal had jurisdiction 
over disputes concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of  UNCLOS, but this UNCLOS dispute implica-
ted the issue of  whether Mauritius or the United King-
dom had sovereignty over the archipelago, an issue that 
fell outside the jurisdiction of  the tribunal.47
In order to determine whether the dispute fell wi-
thin its jurisdiction, the tribunal began by characterizing 
the dispute.48 In making this evaluation, the tribunal ob-
41 ibid.
42 See ibid para 295 (quoting Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain) (Merits) [2001] 
ICJ Rep 40, para 204).
43 UNCLOS (n 29) art 3.
44 Pedra Branca (n 38) para 297.
45 ibid para 299.
46 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v UK) (2015) PCA Case 
No 2011-03, para 203.
47 See Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, The Law of  the Sea and Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation in South-East Asia (OUP 1987) 140; Bernard H 
Oxman, ‘Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ, ITLOS, and Arbitral Tri-
bunals’ in Donald R Rothwell and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of  the Law of  the Sea (OUP 2015) 394, 400; Irina Buga, ‘Territorial 
Sovereignty Issues in Maritime Disputes: A Jurisdictional Dilemma 
for Law of  the Sea Tribunals’ (2012) 27 IJMCL 59, 68, 70-71.
48 See Chagos Marine Protected Area (n 46) paras 208, 211.
served:
There is an extensive record, extending across a 
range of  fora and instruments, documenting the 
Parties’ dispute over sovereignty. . .  . Moreover, . 
. . the consequences of  a finding that the United 
Kingdom is not the coastal State extend well 
beyond the question of  the validity of  the MPA.49
As a result, the tribunal concluded that ‘the Parties’ 
dispute . . . is properly characterized as relating to so-
vereignty over the Chagos Archipelago’,50 such that the 
tribunal did not have jurisdiction over Mauritius’s first 
submission.51
At first glance, one might consider that the deci-
sion was consistent with the doctrine of  indispensable 
issues. Since the determination of  the ‘coastal State’ 
within the meaning of  UNCLOS required a prerequi-
site determination on the sovereignty issue, the tribunal 
could not exercise its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as seen 
in the quote excerpted above, the tribunal relied not on 
this ‘prerequisite determination’ analysis, but rather on 
the historical record of  the dispute and the consequen-
ces of  its decision to find that it did not have jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, in obiter dicta, the tribunal went on to 
note that if  the dispute had been properly characterized 
as an UNCLOS dispute, then its jurisdiction would ‘ex-
tend[] to making such . . . ancillary determinations of  
law as are necessary to resolve the dispute presented 
to it’.52 Therefore, although the tribunal’s disposition 
on Mauritius’s first submission was consistent with the 
doctrine of  indispensable issues, the tribunal’s reaso-
ning was inconsistent with the doctrine.
A second UNCLOS case that dealt with indispen-
sable issues is South China Sea.53 In this case, the Philip-
pines asked an UNCLOS tribunal to declare that China 
had violated multiple UNCLOS provisions through its 
activities in the South China Sea. China, however, ar-
gued that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction becau-
se, inter alia, the ‘essence of  the subject-matter of  the 
arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over maritime 
features in the South China Sea’,54 which generally falls 
49 ibid para 211.
50 ibid para 212.
51 ibid para 221.
52 ibid para 220.
53 South China Sea (Merits) (n 5); South China Sea (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) (n 19). 
54 ‘Position Paper of  the Government of  the People’s Republic 
of  China on the Matter of  Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Ar-
bitration Initiated by the Republic of  the Philippines’ (7 December 
2014) (Position Paper of  China) para 3.
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outside the jurisdiction of  UNCLOS tribunals.55
In order to determine whether it had jurisdiction 
over the dispute, the tribunal held that it was required 
to ‘identify the object of  the claim’.56 It then held:
The Tribunal might consider that the Philippines’ 
Submissions could be understood to relate to 
sovereignty if  it were convinced that either (a) the 
resolution of  the Philippines’ claims would require 
the Tribunal to first render a decision on sovereignty, either 
expressly or implicitly; or (b) the actual objective of  
the Philippines’ claims was to advance its position 
in the Parties’ dispute over sovereignty.57
The tribunal found that neither of  these two ele-
ments was true,58 and therefore upheld its jurisdiction 
over the dispute.59
This holding was consistent with the doctrine of  in-
dispensable issues, as the adjudication of  the Philippi-
nes’ claims did not require a prerequisite determination 
on questions of  sovereignty. Moreover, the tribunal’s 
reasoning in many ways reflected the doctrine of  indis-
pensable issues. The tribunal first sought to ‘identify the 
object of  the claim’, just like identifying the ‘very sub-
ject-matter’ of  the decision. It then applied the test of  
whether the Philippines’ claims would require it to ‘first 
render a decision on sovereignty’, not unlike making a 
prerequisite determination on sovereignty. Indeed, it 
expressly upheld its jurisdiction with respect to certain 
of  the Philippines’ claims because the exercise of  such 
jurisdiction would ‘not [be] dependent on a prior deter-
mination of  sovereignty’.60 Some differences, however, 
remain. The tribunal, for example, also examined the 
‘actual objective’ of  the Philippines’ claims. And it fur-
thermore held that the satisfaction of  the ‘prerequisite 
determination’ test or the ‘actual objective’ test ‘might’ 
(not ‘would’) lead it to consider that the Philippines’ 
submissions ‘could be understood to relate to sove-
reignty’ (not ‘have sovereignty as its subject-matter’).
55 See n 47.
56 South China Sea (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 19) para 150 
(quoting Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 457, para 
30).
57 South China Sea (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 19) para 153 
(emphasis added).
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 ibid para 153; see South China Sea (Merits) (n 5) paras 545, 759, 
927, 1045. Note that the tribunal upheld its jurisdiction based on 
this abstract, logical analysis, rather than through an interpretation 
of  Article 298(1)(a)(i). 
3.2. Investment Law
Elements of  the doctrine of  indispensable issues 
may also be seen in two of  the three Mexican sugar 
investor-State arbitrations. In 2001, Mexico imposed 
a 20% tax on the importation of  any drink that used 
high fructose corn syrup as a sweetener.61 In response, 
three U.S. investors—Archer Daniels Midland (ADM v 
Mexico),62 Corn Products International (CPI v Mexico),63 
and Cargill (Cargill v Mexico)64—instituted arbitration 
proceedings against Mexico under Chapter XI of  the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In 
all three cases, Mexico argued, inter alia, that if  the impo-
sition of  the tax breached its obligations under Chapter 
XI of  NAFTA, the wrongfulness of  this conduct could 
be precluded on the basis of  countermeasures, since the 
United States had allegedly violated other provisions of  
NAFTA.65 The question of  indispensable issues arose 
because the tribunals had jurisdiction over the alleged 
violation of  Chapter XI, but not over the alleged viola-
tion of  other NAFTA provisions. As the CPI v Mexico 
tribunal noted:
Mexico maintained that it was entitled to take 
countermeasures because the United States had 
violated [other] obligations under the NAFTA . . . 
. But the Tribunal . . . does not have jurisdiction to 
determine whether any provision of  the NAFTA 
falling outside Chapter XI has been violated. 
How, then, can the Tribunal determine whether 
the HFCS tax was a response to a prior violation of  
international law? And if  it cannot determine that this 
requirement of  a lawful countermeasure is satisfied, 
how can it uphold Mexico’s countermeasures 
defence?66
All three tribunals ultimately avoided the problem. 
The ADM v Mexico tribunal held that the other require-
ments for countermeasures were not met, so that in any 
case the tax was not a valid countermeasure.67 And the 
CPI v Mexico and Cargill v Mexico tribunals held that, as 
61 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Ameri-
cas, Inc v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/05, 
Award (21 November 2007) para 82.
62 ADM v Mexico (n 61).
63 Corn Products International, Inc v The United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility (15 January 
2008).
64 Cargill, Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (17 September 2008).
65 ADM v Mexico (n 61) paras 110, 124; CPI v Mexico (n 63) para 
150; Cargill v Mexico (n 64) para 379.
66 CPI v Mexico (n 63) para 182 (emphasis added).
67 ADM v Mexico (n 61) paras 180, 182.
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a general matter, Mexico could not invoke countermea-
sures against an investor in Chapter XI proceedings.68
In obiter dicta, however, the ADM v Mexico and CPI v 
Mexico tribunals appeared to support the doctrine of  in-
dispensable issues. The ADM v Mexico tribunal held that 
had the other requirements for countermeasures been 
satisfied, it would have to consider Mexico’s request for 
a stay of  the proceedings.69 And the CPI v Mexico tri-
bunal suggested that Mexico could not succeed on its 
countermeasures defense because Mexico had the bur-
den of  proof  for establishing each of  the requirements 
for countermeasures.70 In both cases, the tribunals thus 
agreed that it would not be able to make an affirma-
tive finding on Mexico’s defense of  countermeasures 
because doing so required a prerequisite determination 
on the lawfulness of  the U.S. measures.
These two decisions, of  course, are insufficient to 
establish a jurisprudence constante. And they arise from a 
context that is, for many reasons, distinguishable from 
the context of  investments on disputed territory. Ne-
vertheless, these two decisions reveal that even invest-
ment tribunals may refuse to make certain legal deter-
minations when doing so would require them to render 
a prerequisite determination on a legal issue outside of  
their jurisdiction ratione materiae.
If  this doctrine of  indispensable issues is applied to 
claims concerning investments on disputed territory, 
the claims would likely be rendered inadmissible. The 
reason is that, since investment protections typically ap-
ply only on the ‘territory’ of  the respondent State under 
the relevant IIA, the determination of  sovereignty over 
the territory in question would be a necessary prerequi-
site to the determination of  whether the investment on 
such territory is protected.
Although the status of  the doctrine of  indispensa-
ble issues is not well established in public international 
law generally, there are four reasons why the doctrine is 
particularly appropriate for investment tribunals, at least 
when compared to the ICJ and UNCLOS tribunals. 
First, in the investment context, it is clear that the 
States party to the IIA never intended investment tribu-
nals to make determinations on territorial sovereignty 
68 CPI v Mexico (n 63) para 161; Cargill v Mexico (n 64) paras 385, 
429.
69 ADM v Mexico (n 61) paras 133.
70 See CPI v Mexico (n 63) para 189.
disputes. The principal function of  investment tribunals 
is to settle investment disputes. It is now widely accep-
ted that they can apply secondary rules of  internatio-
nal law and take into account primary rules of  inter-
national law to aid in its settlement of  these disputes.71 
But investment tribunals were never intended to make 
determinations on territorial sovereignty disputes. On 
the other hand, the ICJ has long settled territorial so-
vereignty disputes.72 As for UNCLOS tribunals, some 
argue that the drafters had intended them to settle terri-
torial disputes in the mixed dispute scenario.73 And even 
those that disagree would acknowledge that the drafters 
intended them to solve maritime delimitation disputes, 
so extending their jurisdiction to resolve territorial dis-
putes would not be as significant of  a leap.
Second, in the investment context, it is not clear 
that the arbitrators would always have the requisite ex-
pertise for settling territorial disputes. Some arbitrators 
appointed for investment disputes have expertise in 
public international law; however, others come from a 
commercial background and have little familiarity with 
public international law. As a result, it may not be ap-
propriate to have arbitrators appointed to settle an in-
vestment dispute also decide serious matters of  public 
international law such as territorial sovereignty. Judges 
and arbitrators on the ICJ and UNCLOS tribunals, on 
the other hand, typically have significant background in 
71 See Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Cen-
tre and the Government of  Ghana, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction 
and Liability (27 October 1989) 95 ILR 184; Mondev International Ltd v 
United States of  America, Award, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/2 (11 
October 2002) 42 ILM 85; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (29 
May 2003) 43 ILM 133; Azurix Corp v The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006); Eric De Brabandere, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law (CUP 2016) 142; 
Moshe Hirsch, ‘Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent 
Paths’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy and others (eds), Human Rights in Inter-
national Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009) 97, 99-105.
72 See eg Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) 
[2012] ICJ Rep 624; Pedra Branca (n 38); Temple of  Preah Vihear (Cam-
bodia v Thailand) (Merits) [1962] ICJ Rep 6; Sovereignty over Certain 
Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands) [1959] ICJ Rep 209.
73 See eg Gudmundur Eiriksson, The International Tribunal for the 
Law of  the Sea (Brill 2000) 113; Alan E Boyle, ‘Dispute Settlement 
and the Law of  the Sea Convention: Problems of  Fragmentation 
and Jurisdiction’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 37, 44; Philippe Gautier, ‘The 
International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea: Activities in 2005’ 
(2006) 5 Chinese JIL 381, 389-390; P Chandrasekhara Rao, ‘Delimi-
tation Disputes Under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of  the Sea: Settlement Procedures’ in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rü-
diger Wolfrum (eds), Law of  the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement 
of  Disputes (Brill 2007) 877, 891-92.
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public international law. 
Third, in the investment context, there would be 
greater questions concerning the legitimacy of  the tri-
bunal to make determinations on territorial disputes. 
Disputes over territorial sovereignty are matters that 
primarily concern the interests of  States. The fact that 
typically only one member of  the tribunal is appointed 
by a State may undermine the legitimacy of  the tribu-
nal to rule on such matters. By contrast, States indirec-
tly nominate the judges of  the ICJ74 and ITLOS,75 and 
usually appoint at least two arbitrators on UNCLOS 
arbitral tribunals.76
Fourth, if  one were to accept the doctrine of  indis-
pensable parties for only territory disputed between two 
States (and not for territory disputed between a State 
and a non-State actor), then it would lead to the argua-
bly unreasonable result that investment claims concer-
ning investments on some disputed territory (disputed 
between two States) would be inadmissible, but claims 
concerning investments on other disputed territory (dis-
puted between a State and a non-State actor) would be 
admissible. The doctrine of  indispensable issues could 
be invoked in the latter case to also render those claims 
inadmissible.
These four reasons provide some support for why, 
even if  the doctrine of  indispensable issues is not wi-
dely recognized in public international law generally, it 
may be appropriate in the context of  investment claims 
concerning investments on disputed territory.
4. escApe mechAnIsms: the crImeA 
ArbItrAtIons
As with many prominent legal issues that come be-
fore international courts and tribunals, there are often 
various ‘escape mechanisms’ that allow the court or 
tribunal to avoid addressing them. The availability of  
such mechanisms would depend on the specific case in 
question. For demonstrative purposes, this Section exa-
mines one line of  cases: the Crimea investor-State arbi-
trations. It should be noted that the Crimea arbitrations 
74 Statute of  the International Court of  Justice (opened for sig-
nature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) UKTS 67 
(1946) (ICJ Statute) art 4(1).
75 UNCLOS (n 29) annex VI, art 4(1).
76 ibid annex VII, art 3.
arise from a particular factual situation; as a result, es-
cape mechanisms available to the Crimea tribunals may 
not necessarily be available to other tribunals seized of  
disputes concerning investments on disputed territory.
As of  August 2017, Ukrainian investors have ins-
tituted at least eight arbitrations against Russia under 
the Russia-Ukraine Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
for expropriating their investments in Crimea.77 Ar-
ticle 1(1) of  the BIT defines ‘investment’ as ‘all kinds 
of  property and intellectual values, which are put in by 
the investor of  one Contracting Party on the territory 
of  the other Contracting Party in conformity with the 
latter’s legislation’.78 It thus appears that the eight tribu-
nals may have to confront the doctrines of  indispen-
sable parties and indispensable issues. Nevertheless, as 
of  August 2017, five of  the eight tribunals have already 
rendered confidential decisions on jurisdiction without 
77 The eight publicly known cases are: (1) Aeroport Belbek LLC 
and Mr. Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky v The Russian Federation; (2) PJSC 
CB PrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v The Russian Federa-
tion; (3) Limited Liability Company Lugzor, Limited Liability Company Lib-
set, Limited Liability Company Ukrinterinvest, Public Joint Stock Company 
DniproAzot, Limited Liability Company Aberon Ltd v The Russian Fed-
eration; (4) Stabil LLC, Rubenor LLC, Rustel LLC, Novel-Estate LLC, 
PII Kirovograd-Nafta LLC, Crimea-Petrol LLC, Pirsan LLC, Trade-Trust 
LLC, Elefteria LLC, VKF Satek LLC, Stemv Group LLC v The Rus-
sian Federation; (5) PJSC Ukrnafta v The Russian Federation; (6) Everest 
Estate LLC et al v The Russian Federation; (7) NJSC Naftogaz of  Ukraine 
(Ukraine) et al v The Russian Federation; and (8) Oschadbank v The Russian 
Federation. For information on the first seven cases, see Permanent 
Court of  Arbitration, ‘Cases’ <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/> ac-
cessed 12 September 2017. For information on the eighth case, see 
Luke Eric Peterson, ‘In the First of  a Possible Wave of  BIT Claims 
by Ukraine State-owned Entities Against Russia, an UNCITRAL 
Tribunal Is Finalized’ (2016) Inv Arb Rep <https://www.iare-
porter.com/articles/in-the-first-of-a-possible-wave-of-bit-claims-
by-ukraine-state-owned-entities-against-russia-an-uncitral-tribunal-
is-finalized/> accessed 12 September 2017; Lacey Yong, ‘Russia 
faces US$2.6 Billion Claim Over Losses in Crimea’ (2016) Global 
Arb Rev <http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1069603/
russia-faces-ususd26-billion-claim-over-losses-in-crimea> accessed 
12 September 2017. For information on a potential ninth case, 
DTEK Krymenergo v The Russian Federation, see IAReporter, ‘Russia 
BIT Claims: Recent Developments in Arbitrations Against the Rus-
sian Federation’ (2017) Inv Arb Rep <https://www.iareporter.com/
articles/russia-bit-claims-recent-developments-in-arbitrations-
against-the-russian-federation/> accessed 12 September 2017; 
Lacey Yong, ‘More Crimea Claims Clear Threshold’ (2017) Global 
Arb Rev <http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1143949/
more-crimea-claims-clear-threshold> accessed 12 September 2017.
78 Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Cabinet 
of  Ministers of  the Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual 
Protection of  Investments (signed 27 November 1998, entered 
into force 27 January 2000) (Russia-Ukraine BIT) art 1(1) (emphasis 
added) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Trea-
tyFile/2233> accessed 12 September 2017.
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dismissing their respective proceedings.79 Although the 
tribunals may have considered the two doctrines, they 
could also simply have availed themselves of  the afo-
rementioned escape mechanisms. A non-exhaustive list 
of  such mechanisms available to the Crimea tribunals is 
provided here.
First, the tribunals could determine that there is 
actually no legal dispute over Crimea. They could find 
that, as a factual matter, Ukraine has sovereignty over 
Crimea. The tribunals could base this ‘factual’ finding 
on determinations by the United Nations General 
Assembly,80 the Venice Commission,81 and the Chair of  
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope82 that the referendum is invalid. This would lead 
to the determination that Crimea is still the territory 
of  Ukraine, thereby relieving Russia of  responsibility 
under the Russia-Ukraine BIT for the alleged expro-
priations. From a broader policy perspective, propo-
79 Permanent Court of  Arbitration, Press Release, ‘Arbitration Be-
tween Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr. Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky 
as Claimants and the Russian Federation: The Tribunal Issues Its 
Interim Award’ (9 March 2017); Permanent Court of  Arbitration, 
Press Release, ‘Arbitration Between PJSC Privatbank and Finance 
Company Finilon LLC as Claimants and the Russian Federation: 
The Tribunal Issues Its Interim Award’ (9 March 2017); Permanent 
Court of  Arbitration, Press Release, ‘Arbitration Between PJSC Ukr-
nafta as Claimant and the Russian Federation—Arbitration Between 
Stabil LLC and Ten Others as Claimants and the Russian Federation: 
The Tribunal Issues Its Awards on Jurisdiction’ (4 July 2017); Per-
manent Court of  Arbitration, Press Release, ‘Arbitration Between 
Everest Estate LLC and Others as Claimants and the Russian Fed-
eration: The Tribunal Issues Its Decision on Jurisdiction’ (5 April 
2017).
80 UNGA Resolution 68/262, Territorial Integrity of  Ukraine, 
UN Doc A/RES/68/262 (27 March 2014) para 6; see ibid para 5; 
see also Baiju S. Vasani and others, ‘Crisis in Crimea: Is Your For-
eign Investment There Protected By a Treaty?’, 10 April 2014, Jones 
Day <http://www.jonesday.com/crisis-in-crimea-is-your-foreign-
investment-there-protected-by-a-treaty-04-10-2014/> accessed 12 
September 2017; Yaraslau Kryvoi and Maria Tsarova, ‘Protecting 
Foreign Investors in Crimea: Is Investment Arbitration an Option?’, 
29 July 2014, CIS Arbitration Forum <http://www.cisarbitration.
com/2014/07/29/protecting-foreign-investors-in-crimea-is-invest-
ment-arbitration-an-option/> accessed 12 September 2017.
81 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission), Opinion on ‘Whether the Decision Taken By the Su-
preme Council of  the Autonomous Republic of  Crimea in Ukraine 
to Organise a Referendum Becoming a Constituent Territory of  
the Russian Federation or Restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is 
Compatible with Constitutional Principles’, Opinion No 762/2014 
(21 March 2014) para 27.
82 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘OSCE 
Chair Says Crimean Referendum in its Current Form is Illegal and 
Calls for Alternative Ways to Address the Crimean Issue’ (11 March 
2014) <http://www.osce.org/cio/116313> accessed 12 September 
2017.
nents of  such a factual finding may point out that the 
recognition of  the existence of  a legitimate legal dispute 
concerning sovereignty over Crimea would incentivize 
States to take unlawful actions to create legal ‘disputes’ 
in order to raise an objection based on the doctrines 
of  indispensable parties and indispensable issues before 
international courts and tribunals, thereby undermining 
the efficient settlement of  disputes.
Second, the tribunals could interpret Article 1(1) of  
the BIT to require only that the investment be in ter-
ritory under the ‘effective control’ and/or ‘jurisdiction 
and/or control’ of  Russia.83 While this would go against 
the text of  the BIT, it would arguably be in line with 
the object and purpose of  the treaty.84 Indeed, this is 
reportedly the line of  argumentation adopted by Ukrai-
ne in its non-disputing party submissions to the various 
Crimea tribunals that have accepted such submissions.85 
The result would be that the tribunals would find that 
they may exercise jurisdiction over the investment clai-
ms, since it is undeniable that Russia has ‘effective con-
trol’ and/or ‘jurisdiction and/or control’ over Crimea.
Third, the tribunals could hold that the word ‘terri-
tory’ in Article 1(1) should be interpreted in reference 
to the time at which the BIT was concluded.86 As the 
argument would go, Russia consented only to apply in-
vestment protection over its ‘territory’ as it existed at 
the time it signed the BIT. The tribunals would thus 
conclude that they may not exercise jurisdiction over 
the dispute. Nevertheless, this argument could contra-
dict the customary ‘moving treaty frontiers’ rule.87
Fourth, along the same lines, the tribunals could 
83 See Richard Happ and Sebastian Wuschka, ‘Horror Vacui: Or 
Why Investment Treaties Should Apply to Illegally Annexed Ter-
ritories’ (2016) 33 Journal of  International Arbitration 245, 260.
84 See ibid.
85 Yong, ‘More Crimea Claims Clear Threshold’ (n 77).
86 Kryvoi and Tsarova (n 80) (‘Apparently when Russia entered 
into investment treaties Crimea was not controlled by it. There-
fore Russia can argue that its consent did not cover the territory of  
Crimea.’).
87 See Vienna Convention on Succession of  States in Respect of  
Treaties (opened for signature 23 August 1978, entered into force 
6 November 1996) 1946 UNTS 3. Commentators and at least one 
tribunal agree that this principle reflects customary international law. 
See eg Sanum Investments v Laos (Jurisdiction) (2013), PCA Case No 
2013-13, para 221; Gerhard Hafner and Gregor Novak, ‘State Suc-
cession in Respect of  Treaties’ in Duncan B Hollis (ed), The Ox-
ford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 396, 399; Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, 
‘La Convention de Vienne sur la Succession d’Etats en Matière de 
Traités’ [‘Vienna Convention on Succession of  States in Respect of  
Treaties’] (1978) 24 AFDI 59, 92.
TZ
E
N
G
, P
et
er
. I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 o
n 
D
isp
ut
ed
 T
er
rit
or
y: 
In
di
sp
en
sa
bl
e 
Pa
rti
es
 a
nd
 In
di
sp
en
sa
bl
e 
Is
su
es
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 1
21
-1
38
134
emphasize that Article 1(1) requires that the investment 
be ‘put in by the investor of  one Contracting Party on 
the territory of  the other Contracting Party in conformi-
ty with the latter’s legislation’.88 Accordingly, regardless of  
which State currently has sovereignty over Crimea, the 
investments were originally put in by the Ukrainian in-
vestors on the territory of  Ukraine in conformity with 
Ukraine’s legislation. Therefore, the tribunal would not 
have jurisdiction over the dispute.
Fifth, the tribunals could find that, despite the so-
vereignty dispute over Crimea, Russia is estopped from 
asserting that Crimea does not constitute part of  its 
‘territory’ given its consistent behaviour over the past 
few years in treating Crimea as part of  its territory. Ne-
vertheless, such a holding may contravene the principle 
that the tribunal should proprio motu consider whether it 
has jurisdiction over the dispute, and not depend solely 
on the objections of  the parties.89
Beyond these possibilities, the tribunals could come 
up with other ways to find or decline jurisdiction whi-
le avoiding the doctrines of  indispensable parties and 
indispensable issues,90 and, of  course, each of  the tri-
bunals could rely on different grounds for making its 
decision. Therefore, although the application of  the 
doctrines of  indispensable parties and indispensable is-
sues may lead to certain results, it is very possible that 
they may not be applied at all in these cases.
88 Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 78) art 1(1) (emphasis added); see 
Sergejs Dilevka, ‘Arbitration Claims by Ukrainian Investors un-
der the Russia-Ukraine BIT: Between Crimea and a Hard Place?’, 
17 February 2016, CIS Arbitration <http://www.cisarbitration.
com/2016/02/17/arbitration-claims-by-ukrainian-investors-un-
der-the-russia-ukraine-bit-between-crimea-and-a-hard-place/> ac-
cessed 12 September 2017; Timur Bondaryev and others, ‘Protect-
ing Investments in Crimea: Does Ukrainian or Russian Law Apply?’ 
(2015) 44 International Law News 14, 16.
89 See Jurisdiction of  the ICAO Council (n 25) para 13; Micula v Ro-
mania (n 25) para 65; Vasani and Foden (n 25) 271; Grabowski (n 
25) 289.
90 For example, one team of  authors asserts that, following the 
case of  Berschader v Russia, the tribunals could decline jurisdiction by 
holding that there is only a dispute with respect to the fact of  ex-
propriation, whereas Article 9(1) of  the BIT only gives jurisdiction 
to the tribunals for disputes ‘arising in connection with investments, 
including disputes related to the amount, terms or compensation 
payment procedure envisaged in Article 5’. Bondaryev and others (n 
88) 17 (quoting Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 78) art 9(1)). See also Ofilio J 
Mayorga, ‘Occupants, Beware of  BITs: Applicability of  Investment 
Treaties to Occupied Territories’ (2017) 19 Palestine YBIL (forth-
coming).
5. fInAl conclusIons
In conclusion, it is not contended that investment 
tribunals must or even should apply the doctrines of  in-
dispensable parties and indispensable issues to disputes 
concerning investments on disputed territory. This is 
particularly the case for the doctrine of  indispensable 
issues because, as emphasized earlier, the author is not 
necessarily of  the opinion that such a doctrine exists or 
should exist in international law. Nevertheless, it is the 
hope of  the author that investment tribunals at least 
consider the applicability of  these two doctrines. If  ap-
plied in an appropriate manner, they could serve as an 
appropriate means of  regulating the jurisdiction ratione 
personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae of  investment 
tribunals.
Notably, the two doctrines may also be applied by 
other international courts and tribunals that may simi-
larly be asked to make a determination on a sovereignty 
dispute prior to settling a dispute of  another subject-
-matter. For example, Article 12(2) of  the Rome Statute 
of  the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides that 
‘the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if  . . . [t]he State 
on the territory of  which the conduct in question occur-
red [is Party to this Statute]’.91 As another example, Ar-
ticle 10 of  the Chicago Convention provides that ‘every 
aircraft which enters the territory of  a contracting State 
shall, if  the regulations of  that State so require, land at 
an airport designated by that State for the purpose of  
customs and other examination’.92 As a third example, 
Article 72(2) of  the FIFA Statutes provide that ‘[m]em-
ber associations and their clubs may not play on the ter-
ritory of  another member association without the latter’s 
approval’.93 In all of  these cases, if  a court or tribunal 
has jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the applica-
tion of  the provision in question in disputed territory, 
it may have to make a prerequisite determination on 
the sovereignty dispute. The doctrines of  indispensable 
parties and indispensable issues could potentially bar 
91 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (opened for 
signature 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 
90 (Rome Statute) art 12(2) (emphasis added).
92 Convention on International Civil Aviation (signed 7 Decem-
ber 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947) 15 UNTS 295 (Chicago 
Convention) art 10 (emphasis added).
93 FIFA Statutes: Regulations Governing the Application of  the 
Statutes (May 2008) art 72(2) (emphasis added) <https://resources.
fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/09/75/14/
fifa_statutes_072008_en.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017.
TZ
E
N
G
, P
et
er
. I
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 o
n 
D
isp
ut
ed
 T
er
rit
or
y: 
In
di
sp
en
sa
bl
e 
Pa
rti
es
 a
nd
 In
di
sp
en
sa
bl
e 
Is
su
es
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 1
21
-1
38
135
the court or tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over 
such cases.
The key takeaway is that international courts and tri-
bunals must not go beyond the limited scope of  their 
jurisdiction. Staying within the powers conferred upon 
them is critical not only for the legitimacy of  their de-
cisions, but also for the overarching stability of  the dis-
pute settlement system of  the international legal order. 
It is thus the hope of  the author that, at the very least, 
investment tribunals seized of  disputes concerning in-
vestments on disputed territories consider applying the 
doctrines of  indispensable parties and indispensable is-
sues.
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